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A REFORMATION REMEDY FOR EDUCATORS
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICIES
ABSTRACT
Third-party liability insurance held by public school districts, including
educators professional liability insurance and general commercial liability
insurance, occupies a unique economic and political role. Coverage of tort
claims against school districts and the regulatory effect of the scope of such
coverage are important public policy issues. Nevertheless, the application of
traditional insurance doctrine to school districts has received little attention,
either from advocates for changes to the law of liability insurance or from
those analyzing trends in tort liability in the public education context.
In light of public policy concerns, courts have traditionally resisted the
application of insurance policy rescission to cases of application
misrepresentations by school districts. Without an alternative remedy
available, courts have turned to other theories, such as waiver or contra
proferentem, often going so far as to decline to engage in any doctrinal
analysis of the misrepresentation at issue. Furthermore, courts’ attempts to
avoid rescission come at the expense of insurers, who at times do not recover
any of the costs incurred by even a fraudulent or material misrepresentation.
This Comment will propose a reformation remedy that acknowledges the
public interest in ensuring compensation for injuries sustained by children as a
result of misconduct in the course of education. A reformation remedy would
clarify the body of law that has grown around school district
misrepresentations by allowing courts to avoid the strained application of
alternative legal theories. It would allow insurers to recover their actual losses
while also providing coverage for the vulnerable plaintiffs of educational
misconduct. Finally, it would ensure a more efficient liability insurance market
for school districts by improving the accuracy of pricing for individual school
districts and cost spreading across districts with wide disparities in resources.
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INTRODUCTION
The Second Tentative Draft of the Principles of the Law of Liability
Insurance was approved at the American Law Institute (ALI) Annual Meeting
in May 2014.1 In October 2014, the project was renamed the Restatement of
the Law, Liability Insurance.2 The ALI Council elected to rename the project
because, as ALI Director Richard Revesz explained, Restatements “seek to
provide guidance to courts . . . where there is a body of established positive
law.3 The project’s reporters revised the previously approved chapters to better
reflect the nature of a Restatement as a distillation and refinement of existing
common law, and circulated the revised draft for discussion at the ALI 2015
Annual Meeting.4
While not binding, ALI projects, including model codes, restatements, and
principles, allow “leading representatives, from all parts of the country, of the
bench, the bar, and the principal law schools,”5 to converse with courts and
legislatures on the current state of the law and proposals for reform.6 While
some ALI projects have been more widely adopted than others, ALI projects
remain at the forefront of legal synthesis and reform.7
The Principles of the Law of Liability Insurance offered recommendations
distilled from input across the industry: the Project’s advisors include judges,
professors, and practitioners representing the insurance industry and
policyholders.8 Former ALI Director Lance Liebman stated that the goal of the
Principles was to draft “coherent doctrinal statements based largely on current
1

Randy J. Maniloff, Update: ALI’s Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance, LEXISNEXIS LEGAL
NEWSROOM (July 15, 2015, 3:37 PM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/insurance/b/insurancelaw/
archive/2015/07/15/update-ali-s-restatement-of-the-law-of-liability-insurance.aspx#sthash.THOxZsFD.dpuf.
2 Id.
3 Id. Professors Peter Alces and Chris Byrne note that Principles projects are “more appropriate than
Restatements in situations where the law is unsettled or where a more fundamental revision of the law is
needed, especially in legal areas governed by both statutes and the common law.” Peter A. Alces & Chris
Byrne, Is It Time for the Restatement of Contracts, Fourth?, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 195, 200 (2009) (citing AM.
LAW INST., MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE viii (1942)).
4 Maniloff, supra note 1.
5 Alces & Byrne, supra note 3, at 198 (quoting 3 A.L.I. PROC. 59 (1925)).
6 See id. at 196–207 (summarizing the history of ALI projects and the trend away from model codes and
toward principles projects).
7 Bennett Boskey, The American Law Institute: A Glimpse at Its Future, 12 GREEN BAG 2D 255, 261–62
(noting that ALI Principles projects are poised “to achieve substantial and timely law reform”).
8 Michael F. Aylward & Lorelie S. Masters, A “Principled” Approach to Coverage? The American Law
Institute and Its Principles of the Law of Liability Insurance, 81 DEF. COUNS. J. 117, 117–18 (2014).
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state law, but also grounded in economic efficiency and in fairness to both
insureds and insurers.”9 Additionally, the project sought to reduce litigation
over insurance coverage by providing a streamlined approach to policy
interpretation.10 In summarizing the revisions made to adapt the Principles into
a Restatement, the Reporters noted that “a few of these changes may result in
the Institute supporting rules that it would not support were it writing on a
blank slate,” but that these compromises were justified by the “persuasive”
power of a Restatement “to contribute to the improvement of the law of
liability insurance.”11 Despite their reliance on prevailing applications of the
law, Restatements are not devoid of prescriptive power; the ALI has noted that
Restatements are “intended to reflect the flexibility and capacity for
development and growth of the common law” and that a Restatement’s choice
of individual rules “leads to more coherence in the law.”12
The Restatement’s Reporter, Tom Baker, and the Associate Reporter, Kyle
Logue,13 have published extensively on the economic and policy contours of
corporate Directors and Officers Liability (D&O) coverage,14 auto insurance,15
and legal malpractice, among other third-party insurance schemes, as well as
on economic and political issues including the moral hazard effects of
insurance16 and insurance discrimination.17 This Comment will analyze the
relationship between the Restatement’s proposals and a less-understood area of
liability insurance: educators professional liability insurance and commercial
general liability insurance held by school districts. There has been considerable
recent discussion of policy concerns undergirding tort liability for educators
and school districts in specific contexts, including supervision of disabled

9 Conference on the ALI’s Principles of the Law of Liability Insurance, RUTGERS L. SCH. [hereinafter
ALI Conference], https://camlaw.rutgers.edu/conference-ali%E2%80%99s-principles-law-liability-insurance
(last visited Mar. 24, 2016).
10 See Aylward & Masters, supra note 8, at 119.
11 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: LIAB. INS. xix (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2015).
12 Id. at x–xi.
13 Id. at iv.
14 See, e.g., TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW LIABILITY
INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 202 (2010).
15 Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers Professional
Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412, 1427 (2013).
16 Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard,
111 MICH. L. REV. 197 (2012).
17 Ronen Avraham, Kyle D. Logue & Daniel Schwarcz, Understanding Insurance Antidiscrimination
Laws, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 195 (2014).
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students and teachers’ fiduciary duties to students.18 In contrast, existing
scholarship on public education does not include an analysis of the application
of third-party liability insurance principles to the unique economic and policy
concerns inherent in public education.19
This Comment will address this gap by analyzing the application of
liability insurance doctrine to school systems in the context of application
misrepresentations. The Principles suggested a number of innovative
approaches to traditional insurance doctrine, almost all of which were designed
to foster economic efficiency and fairness in relationships between insurers
and insureds, such as individual insureds in the case of auto insurance and
large public companies in the case of D&O coverage.20 Chapters 1 and 2,
revised in 2015 and slated for consideration by the ALI’s members at the 2016
annual meeting, cover Interpretation, Waiver and Estoppel, Misrepresentation,
and the Insurer’s Duty to Defend.21
This Comment addresses §§ 7–11 of the Principles and the corresponding
§§ 7–9 of the Restatement, which set forth proposals for the treatment of
misrepresentations made by insureds during the application process,
particularly in regard to the availability of rescission as a remedy for insurers
when the applicant has made a misrepresentation in the application for the
18 See, e.g., Lynn M. Daggett, Reasonable Supervision of Special Students: The Impact of Disability on
School Liability for Student Injury, 43 J.L. & EDUC. 303 (2014); John E. Rumel, Back to the Future: The In
Loco Parentis Doctrine and Its Impact on Whether K-12 Schools and Teachers Owe a Fiduciary Duty to
Students, 46 IND. L. REV. 711 (2013).
19 Existing scholarship touches on the impact of liability insurance in shaping tort recovery; for example,
Professor Lynn Daggett notes that a plaintiff is likely to sue when he or she sees a school as “a ‘deep pocket’
with significant financial resources and likely a liability insurance policy with high limits,” and that the
insurers’ frequent choice of defense counsel inexperienced in special education law may result in a plaintiff’s
disability being marginalized in a resulting judicial opinion. Daggett, supra note 18, at 307, 335–36. Other
scholarship has discussed the role of liability insurance in waiving school district governmental immunity,
which is explored in Part II. See also Basil Markesinis & Adrian R. Stewart, Tortious Liability for Negligent
Misdiagnosis of Learning Disabilities: A Comparative Study of English and American Law, 36 TEX. INT’L L.J.
427, 455–57 (2001) (discussing whether the regulation of educator behavior through liability and liability
insurance is desirable, but not addressing the operative effect on school districts of specific rules of insurance
policy application and interpretation). Existing scholarship often cites the popularity and cost of liability
insurance policies as indicators of the impact of the threat of litigation on educators. See, e.g., Brett G. Scharffs
& John W. Welch, An Analytic Framework for Understanding and Evaluating the Fiduciary Duties of
Educators, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 159, 159 (noting that purchases of liability insurance demonstrate that
“[t]he law, it seems, is of increasing concern to teachers and educators”); Perry A. Zirkel, Paralyzing Fear?
Avoiding Distorted Assessments of the Effect of Law on Education, 35 J.L. & EDUC. 461, 463 (2006).
20 ALI Conference, supra note 9.
21 Maniloff, supra note 1.
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insurance policy.22 Rescission, which has traditionally been available for a
wide range of misrepresentations under state statutes and common law, is a
comprehensive remedy; not only does it allow the insurer to “avoid any
liability for benefits provided under the policy, even on pending claims,” it
also voids the policy’s existence.23 Sections 7 through 9 define the
circumstances in which the Restatement would allow misrepresentation to
permit the insurer to rescind the policy.24 Section 11 of the Principles
suggested a quasi-reformation remedy designed to “provide more transparent
and predictable protection to insureds acting in good faith than the devices
presently used to limit rescission.”25 While acknowledging the validity of this
policy concern, the Reporters determined that such an innovative approach to
innocent misrepresentations was beyond the scope of a Restatement, noting
that “there is not yet sufficient common-law authority to that effect despite the
longstanding recognition of the unfairness of the strict-liability approach and
the power of common-law courts to change common-law rules.”26
The Principles originally argued that the availability of rescission when the
insured has made an innocent misrepresentation that is not intentional or
reckless was “unfair” and “draconian” because such a mistake is “among the
sorts of risks for which the policyholder purchased insurance in the first
place.”27 Critics of the strict liability approach have pointed out that, in
addition to the inherent unfairness of the approach, the “fact-driven and ad
hoc” doctrines courts have developed to soften the harsh outcome of rescission
in particular cases are inefficient and costly for parties.28 This Comment will
argue that the effects of this avoidance are particularly strong in the field of
22 RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS. §§ 7–9 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2015); AM. LAW INST.,
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE §§ 7–11 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2013) [hereinafter
PRINCIPLES]. The Reporters note that misrepresentation was “the topic that ha[d] the most significant revision”
in the Restatement draft. RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS., at xvii.
23 Atmel Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine, 426 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (“Where grounds
for rescission exist and the insurer properly exercises its right to rescind, the insured’s contract rights are
extinguished ab initio (as if the policy had never existed).”). Because the “purpose of rescission . . . is to return
the parties to the status quo,” unlike in a claim for cancellation, the court may “condition the grant of
rescission on the insurer’s compliance with the court’s order to tender to the insured the premiums paid.” Tig
Ins. Co. v. Reliable Research Co., 228 F. Supp. 2d 921, 929 (S.D. Ill. 2002), aff’d, 334 F.3d 630 (7th Cir.
2003).
24 PRINCIPLES, supra note 22, §§ 7–10.
25 RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS., at xvi.
26 Id. § 7 cmt. j.
27 PRINCIPLES, supra note 22, § 7.
28 Brian Barnes, Note, Against Insurance Rescission, 120 YALE L.J. 328, 356–57 (2010).
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educators professional liability policies and school districts’ commercial
general liability insurance policies, for which compensating those injured by
the public education system is a pressing policy priority.29
The Principles limited the mandatory reformation remedy to small
commercial policyholders, designating the remedy as a waivable default for
policyholders with assets of more than $10 million.30 The Principles explained
that this exemption of large commercial policyholders was rooted in the
sophistication of the parties, rather than the nature of the policyholder’s
business, noting that “[t]he vast majority of organizations, whether operated
for profit or not, that have $10 million in assets should be able to hire
reasonably sophisticated advisors.”31 The Restatement abolished the large and
small commercial policyholder distinction on the grounds that such “a
bright-line distinction . . . is more appropriate for a legislature or a regulatory
agency.”32 The Restatement’s rescission remedy for innocent
misrepresentations now applies to all policyholders, regardless of size.33
This Comment will argue that school systems have little else in common
with the other commercial policyholders the Restatement primarily addresses.
School systems occupy a unique policy and economic position which demands
specialized rules of policy interpretation. The application of the Restatement’s
standardized treatment to the unique case of school systems does not effectuate
the goals of fostering economic efficiency and fairness to insurers and
insureds, nor does it lead to coherence in the law. This Comment will argue
29 See, e.g., Dawn A. Ellison, Comment, Sexual Harassment in Education: A Review of Standards for
Institutional Liability Under Title IX, 75 N.C. L. REV. 2049, 2121 n.527 (1997) (“The educational process
itself is founded upon the development of dependent, trusting relations between students and teachers . . . .
Students of all ages are exceptionally vulnerable to the advances and sexual conduct of teachers, and are often
incapable of either recognizing or objecting to the impropriety of their teachers’ behavior.” (quoting Stefanie
H. Roth, Sex Discrimination 101: Developing a Title IX Analysis for Sexual Harassment in Education, 23 J.L.
& EDUC. 459, 509–10 (1994))).
30 PRINCIPLES, supra note 22, § 1 cmt. b. Under this approach, the quasi-reformation remedy would not
have been mandatory for school system policyholders because the insureds under commercial general liability
and educators professional liability policies are usually school districts or cooperatives of multiple school
districts with high asset values. See, e.g., Haley v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 749 F. Supp. 560 (D. Vt. 1990) (noting that
the insured was a seven-district union).
31 PRINCIPLES, supra note 22, § 1 cmt. b.
32 RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS. xvii (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2015). The regulatory nature of
the distinction is underscored by the fact that the Principles distinguished between large and small commercial
policyholders by tracking the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s registration requirements.
PRINCIPLES, supra note 22, § 1 cmt. b.
33 RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS. § 7.
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that the reformation remedy originally envisioned by the Principles should be
available to courts in the case of school system policyholders because school
systems face a different regulatory environment, have different behavioral
incentives, and require different policy considerations than other policyholders.
Part I will discuss the current state of insurance doctrine as applied to
school districts. It will address the key provisions set forth in §§ 7–11 of the
Principles and §§ 7–9 of the Restatement in light of state statutes and the
common law. It will then analyze how courts have struggled to apply
traditional insurance doctrine to educators liability insurance policies in light
of policy concerns unique to the public education system. In cases of material
misrepresentation by school districts, courts have eschewed addressing the
statutory elements of the misrepresentation defense at all, turning instead to
alternative doctrines that ensure coverage. The judiciary’s consistent emphasis
on policy considerations suggests that a policy reformation remedy would
ensure fairness for insurers and insureds by allowing courts to avoid rescission,
ensuring coverage for vulnerable education claimants, and enabling insurance
companies to recover losses that result from misrepresentation.
Part II will argue that school districts should not be treated like other
commercial policyholders because the Reporters’ emphasis on the
policyholder’s sophistication and freedom of contract does not adequately
justify the unduly harsh outcomes for school systems that would result under
the Restatement’s approach to misrepresentations. The Restatement’s
standardized approach elides the substantive differences between school
districts and other commercial policyholders, including lack of profit incentive
for risk-taking and different regulatory contexts. Furthermore, the unique
public interest in compensating vulnerable student plaintiffs renders coverage
more critical for school districts than public companies.
Part III will propose a reformation remedy tailored to the policy concerns
undergirding school district liability. By applying in cases of both innocent and
intentional misrepresentations, this remedy will provide a legal framework for
ensuring compensation for victims of school district negligence without
undercutting the rights of insurers in the manner of past judicial approaches to
the problem.
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I. RESCISSION OF INSURANCE POLICIES HELD BY SCHOOL DISTRICTS UNDER
CURRENT INSURANCE DOCTRINE
The Principles couched several of its most innovative provisions as new
rules, which would have been mandatory as applied to small policyholders,
while serving as default rules that large commercial policyholders and insurers
could alter by contract.34 One of these rules provided a quasi-reformation
remedy to small policyholders who made innocent misrepresentations,
allowing courts to avoid the harshness of rescission for innocent insureds while
compensating insurers for bearing the increased risk the policyholder created
through the misrepresentation.35 The Restatement rejected this reformation
remedy and the intentionality standard for rescission, allowing insurers to
rescind any insurance policy in the event of material misrepresentation on
which the insurer relied.36
This Part will discuss rescission as it has been available under state law for
both innocent and intentional misrepresentations. It will address the Principles’
proposed reforms, including the quasi-reformation remedy for innocent
misrepresentations, and the Restatement’s treatment of those reforms. It will
then show that courts have sought alternative doctrines to avoid rescinding
educators professional liability insurance and general commercial liability
insurance policies held by school districts, and that these doctrines lead to
decreased coherence and do not protect the rights of insurers and insureds.
A. State Law Approaches to Misrepresentation Remedies
In what the Principles referred to as innovative “incremental law
reforms,”37 § 7 limited the possibility of policy rescission to misrepresentations
that are intentional or reckless, material, and upon which the insurer reasonably
relied.38 One of the most dramatic changes to current law was the Principles’

34

PRINCIPLES, supra note 22, § 1 cmt. b.
Id. § 7 cmt. b.
36 RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS. § 7.
37 Id. § 7 cmt. b.
38 Id. The materiality and reliance requirements, outlined in §§ 9 and 10, are largely consistent with state
law. Id. § 9 reporters’ note a (describing reliance as a “well-settled part of the doctrine of misrepresentation”);
id. § 10 reporters’ note a (describing the “increased-risk standard of materiality” as adopted by law in several
states).
35
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exclusion of innocent misrepresentations that fail to meet the intentional or
reckless standard.39
As the Reporters note in the Restatement, this approach presented a notable
departure from existing law, under which rescission is frequently afforded for
innocent misrepresentations.40 In ordering rescission for “inaccuracies in
financial statements attached to a policy application,” the Eleventh Circuit
noted that the Florida statute at issue “contain[ed] no knowledge or intent
element; unintentional or unknowing misstatements bar recovery under
a policy if they alter the risk or the likelihood of coverage.”41 Similarly, the
District Court for the Eastern District of California ordered rescission where an
insured accidentally used a broker-recommended template that did not disclose
the information.42 The court held that “even an unintentional non-disclosure is
sufficient to support rescission of an insurance contract, if the non-disclosed
information was material to the contract.”43 In rescinding a policy as to a
director who was not involved in the preparation of the insurance application,
the District Court for the Southern District of New York explained that while
“leaving an allegedly innocent outside director without D&O coverage may
seem harsh,” recognition of the policy would also injure “the innocent
insurance company which was deceived.”44
The Restatement’s approach to innocent misrepresentations closely tracks
insurance law as codified in a number of states, in which rescission has long

39 Section 8 defines “intentional” misrepresentations as those in which “the policyholder knows or
believes the statement is false” and “reckless” misrepresentations as those in which “the policyholder is
wilfully indifferent to whether the statement is true or false.” Id. § 8. For a discussion of the history and
economic principles undergirding the problem of innocent misrepresentations, see PRINCIPLES, supra note 22,
§ 7 reporters’ note b; Ronen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law—A Primer, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 29,
53–59 (2012–2013); Barnes, supra note 28, at 332–35.
40 RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS. xvii, § 7 cmt. j.
41 Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Sahlen, 999 F.2d 1532, 1536 (11th Cir. 1993).
42 Admiral Ins. Co. v. Debber, 442 F. Supp. 2d 958, 967 (E.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d, 295 Fed. App’x 171 (9th
Cir. 2008).
43 Id. (espousing a permissive definition of materiality, stating that “where specific questions are asked of
the insured, the answers to those questions are normally deemed material to the contract”).
44 Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Towers Fin. Corp., No. 94 Civ. 2727 (WK)(AJP), 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22610, at *30 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1997) (quoting Mazur v. Gaudet, 826 F. Supp. 188, 195 (E.D. La.
1992)); see also Bird v. Penn Cent. Co., 341 F. Supp. 291, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (“While we sympathize with
movants’ position, and recognize that innocent officers and directors are likely to suffer if the entire policy is
voidable because of one man’s fraudulent response, it must be recognized that plaintiff insurers are likewise
innocent parties.”).
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been available for insurers for a wide range of misrepresentations.45
Mississippi law, for example, allows a misrepresentation to bar recovery when
it “materially affected either the acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed
by the insurer,” regardless of whether the insured is aware of the
misrepresentation.46 Similarly, under Virginia law, recovery may be denied
when the insurer can demonstrate by clear proof that the representation was
both untrue and material to the risk.47 Under Oklahoma law, the insurer need
only demonstrate that the misrepresentation was fraudulent or material “to the
acceptance of the risk, or to the hazard assumed by the insurer.”48
In contrast, several states have adopted a knowledge or intent requirement
analogous to the one originally proposed by the Principles.49 Texas common
law provides that in addition to falsehood, materiality, and reliance, an insurer
must prove “the intent to deceive on the part of the insured in making the
misrepresentation.”50 Similarly, Louisiana law prohibits voidance of a policy
unless the misrepresentations were made “with the intent to deceive,”51 and
Arizona law requires that misrepresentations be “fraudulent” to justify
rescission.52 Washington law requires that the insured knowingly made the
misrepresentations and intended to deceive the insurer.53

45 Deborah F. Cohen, Timothy E. DeMasi & Aaron Krauss, Uberrimae Fidei and Reinsurance
Rescission: Does a Gentlemen’s Agreement Have a Place in Today’s Commercial Market?, 29 TORT & INS.
L.J. 602, 604 (1994) (explaining that “the grounds for rescission” of reinsurance policies under various state
laws “may include fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, innocent misrepresentation, nondisclosure,
breach of contract, and mutual or unilateral mistake”); Joseph K. Powers, Pulling the Plug on Fidelity, Crime,
and All Risk Coverage: The Availability of Rescission as a Remedy or Defense, 32 TORT & INS. L.J. 905, 905
(1997) (noting that the “common law of contract has long recognized that where one party to a contract has
been induced by false representations made by the other party, regardless of whether such representations are
made with the intent to deceive, the misled party may treat the contract as voidable”).
46 MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-9-11(3) (West 1999).
47 VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-309 (West 2016).
48 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3609(A) (West 2011).
49 John Dwight Ingram, Misrepresentations in Applications for Insurance, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV.
103, 106 (2005) (explaining that the costs of the heightened standard are “borne by the diligent or lucky
insurance buyers who do not unintentionally misrepresent, or do not have a claim, or whose misrepresentation
is not discovered”).
50 Bates v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
51 LA. STAT. ANN. § 22:860 (2011) (except in the cases of “life, annuity, or health and accident
insurance”).
52 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1109 (2010).
53 Ki Sin Kim v. Allstate Ins. Co., 223 P.3d 1180, 1189 (2009) (noting a presumption of intent to deceive
when insured “knowingly makes a false statement”).
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Several states have codified additional standards giving rise to rescission.
Under the doctrine of concealment, the policy may be rescinded upon failure of
the insured to proactively disclose material information.54 Rescission for
concealment is codified in a number of states, in which it is permitted under
the same conditions as rescission for misrepresentations.55 In contrast, the
contribute-to-the-loss approach, codified in several states, presents a
heightened standard for rescission. Under a contribute-to-the-loss requirement,
a misrepresentation may serve as the basis for rescission only if it actually
plays a role in causing the harm giving rise to the claim at issue.56
Massachusetts law incorporates an intention or causation-of-the-loss
requirement into the definition of materiality, noting that the policy cannot be
avoided unless the misrepresentation “is made with actual intent to deceive” or
the subject of the misrepresentation “increased the risk of loss.”57
The Principles and the Restatement have rejected both of these alternative
standards. The Reporters place the onus of discovery on insurers, noting that
insurers “have learned to ask questions about the risk factors that they regard
as material.”58 The Restatement also rejects the contribute-to-the-loss doctrine
on grounds that it does not address the problem of adverse selection;59 presents
evidentiary problems that ineffectively spread the cost of losses among

54 Barry Zalma, Rescission, 37 UWLA L. REV. 204, 205 (2004) (defining concealment as “neglect to
communicate that which a party knows, and ought to communicate” (quoting CAL. INS. CODE §§ 331, 359
(1935))).
55 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.409(1) (West Supp. 2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3609(A)
(West 2011).
56 See, e.g., KAN. STAT ANN. § 40-418 (West 2008) (stating that misrepresentation is not material “unless
the matter misrepresented shall have actually contributed to the contingency or event on which the policy is to
become due and payable”). In contrast, several states, like the Principles, have specifically rejected the
contribute to the loss doctrine. See, e.g., Tig Ins. Co. v. Reliable Research Co., 228 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (S.D.
Ill. 2002) (“The misrepresentation on the application through which the insurer seeks rescission need not be
related to the claim for which the insured eventually seeks coverage.”).
57 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 186 (West 2011).
58 RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS. § 7 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2015).
59 Id. § 9 cmt. b. “A theoretical concept first appearing in the late nineteenth century, adverse selection
describes the phenomenon of high-risk parties who, knowing their ‘type,’ seek more insurance coverage than
low-risk parties.” Avraham, supra note 39, at 44. Professor Avraham also notes the possibility of “reverse
adverse selection,” in which insureds are not sufficiently informed to distinguish between low- and
high-quality insurers, resulted in a market dominated by low-quality insurers offering lower premiums. Id. at
61.
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insureds in different factual situations; and is not as efficient as the intentional
or reckless standard in screening out “arbitrary” outcomes.60
B. The Principles and Restatement Approaches to Misrepresentation
Remedies
In light of its rejection of alternative statutory standards for rescission, the
Principles proposed a bifurcated “quasi-reformation” remedy for innocent
misrepresentations by small commercial policyholders.61 Under the Principles’
approach, the type of policy reformation available would have depended on
whether the insurer would have issued the policy had the misrepresentation not
occurred.62 If the insurer would have issued the policy even in light of the true
facts, the Principles would have allowed the insurer to collect or “deduct from
the claim payment the additional premium that would have been charged.”63 In
contrast, if the insurer would not have issued the policy if it had known the
truth, then the Principles would have permitted the insurer to collect “a
reasonable additional premium for the increased risk.”64 The insurer would
also have been permitted to prospectively cancel the policy upon innocent
misrepresentation “within a reasonable time of the discovery.”65
While the Principles’ quasi-reformation remedy addressed many of the
problems of inconsistency and inequity inherent in the rescission scheme, it
also increased the potential for abuse by insureds seeking “to insure an
uninsurable risk or obtain lower premiums.”66 Rescission may allow insurers to
60 RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS. § 9 cmt. b. For a discussion of the inefficiencies created by the
contribute-to-the-loss doctrine, see Barnes, supra note 28, at 354–55 (stating that the doctrine “invites a
similarly amorphous judicial inquiry” that tempts courts to “‘stretch the facts’ to make use of them”).
61 PRINCIPLES, supra note 22, § 11 cmt. a. In addressing the definitional limits of “innocent
misrepresentations,” the Principles explain that “[t]he misrepresentations to which this Section applies are, at
worst, examples of negligent behavior on the part of the policyholder.” Id.
62 Id. § 11.
63 Id. By compensating the insurer for the detrimental reliance of charging lower premiums, reformation
in this case solves a problem inherent in insurance policies: rescission cannot put the parties back into the
position they would have been in without the contract. Id. § 11 cmt. b (“It is too late to buy another insurance
policy.”); see also Barnes, supra note 28, at 344–45 (2010) (“[T]he plaintiff cannot use [rescission] to recover
the benefit of his bargain or his reliance interest.”).
64 PRINCIPLES, supra note 22, § 11.
65 Id.
66 Id. § 11 cmts. b, f; see also Eugene R. Anderson, Richard G. Tuttle & Susannah Crego, Draconian
Forfeitures of Insurance: Commonplace, Indefensible, and Unnecessary, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 825, 827
(1996) (calling forfeiture of insurance policies a “massive and disproportionate penalty in relation to the
policyholder’s . . . noncompliance”).
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engage in “post-claim underwriting,” in which the insurer postpones a full
investigation into insurability until an insured makes a claim.67 Post-claim
underwriting also presents an acute risk in the context of quasi-reformation, in
which the insurer is asked to estimate a reasonable premium for the risk that
has already occurred.68 However, the Reporters argued that the provision
would foster better information gathering among insurers because “[t]he better
[a] policyholder is informed of how to fill out the insurance application . . . the
more likely any misrepresentation would be deemed to be reckless or
intentional.”69 Citing policy concerns grounded in the sophistication of the
parties, the Principles explained that the quasi-reformation remedy available
for innocent misrepresentations under §§ 7–11 need not be mandatory in the
case of large commercial policyholders.70 The Restatement eliminates the
quasi-reformation remedy altogether, placing all policyholders in the position
of the most sophisticated policyholders under the Principles scheme.71 Despite
the fact that school districts are often just as sophisticated as other commercial
policyholders, the Restatement’s rescission scheme is ill-suited to educators
professional liability insurance because of the unique policy concerns inherent
in school district liability.
C. Judicial Efforts to Avoid the Application of Rescission to School Districts
Courts have struggled to apply a strict doctrinal approach to
misrepresentation rescissions in the case of educators professional liability
insurance. This section will discuss two cases in which courts have skirted the
doctrinal elements of insurance law to avoid rescinding policies based on
misrepresentations in the insurance application. It will also show that courts
have prioritized policy concerns over the doctrinal elements of the
misrepresentation defense by avoiding rescission of educators professional
liability policies even when the elements of the misrepresentation defense are
met. It will then suggest how and why such cases would be better resolved
through policy reformation.
When faced with material misrepresentations by school districts, courts
have extended coverage through alternative doctrines. These courts have
67
68
69
70
71

Barnes, supra note 28, at 339–41.
PRINCIPLES, supra note 22, § 11(2).
Id. § 11 cmt. e.
Id.
RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS. § 7 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2015).

WOOD GALLEYSPROOFS2

1424

5/27/2016 10:20 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:1411

declined to analyze the statutory elements of misrepresentation at all, ignoring
whether a school district’s misrepresentations were material, whether they
were innocent or fraudulent, or whether they met any heightened statutory
standards for rescission.72 Instead, courts have bypassed the misrepresentation
analysis entirely, looking directly to alternative doctrines to ensure coverage in
light of policy preferences for coverage of school districts’ claims.73
One doctrine that has allowed courts to avoid rescission is contra
proferentem. In the insurance context, contra proferentem, the “contra-insurer
rule,” “provides that where an insurer drafts a policy ‘any ambiguity in
[the] . . . policy should be resolved in favor of the insured.’”74 The flexibility of
this rule, and its posture favoring the insured, allow courts to search for
implausible ambiguities that permit a finding that the insured did not in fact
make a misrepresentation, or that such a representation was not material. For
example, in Stratford School District v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., the
First Circuit, applying contra proferentem, affirmed the district court’s finding
that the school district did not make a material misrepresentation on its
insurance application.75 Stratford’s errors-and-omissions policy application
contained the question, “Are there any circumstances indicating the probability
of a claim or action known by any person to be covered by this insurance?”76
Stratford answered in the negative.77 The policy contained a corresponding
exclusion for claims for which “the Insured ha[d] become aware of a
proceeding, event or development which has resulted in or could in the future
result in the institution of a claim against the Insured.”78

72

See Ingram, supra note 49, at 104–06 (laying out the statutory elements in various jurisdictions).
See, e.g., Haley v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 749 F. Supp. 560, 565–69, 571 (D. Vt. 1990) (turning to waiver to
establish coverage in light of “policy considerations in favor of attracting citizens to serve on community
school boards”), aff’d without opinion by Haley v. Cont’l, 927 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1991).
74 Jefferson Block 24 Oil & Gas, L.L.C. v. Aspen Ins. UK Ltd., 652 F.3d 584, 589 (5th Cir. 2011)
(alteration in original) (quoting McCostis v. Home Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 1994)). While contra
proferentem is a canon of general contract law construing ambiguous language against the drafter, it “has
historically been regarded as a last resort.” Econ. Premier Assurance Co. v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 839
N.W.2d 749, 754 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013). In contrast, “the rule has assumed a more prominent role in
American insurance law and is now the analytical starting point for courts interpreting ambiguous insurance
language.” Id. at 755.
75 105 F.3d 45, 46 (1st Cir. 1997).
76 Id. at 46.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 47 (emphasis omitted).
73
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Stratford applied for the policy four days after receiving a subpoena related
to an investigation for criminal sexual misconduct of one of its former
teachers.79 While at Stratford, the teacher had been reprimanded by the Board
because he “had inappropriately hugged and kissed female students”; however,
Stratford did not report the incident.80 The investigation pertained to contact
with students that occurred while the teacher was employed in another school
district.81 The First Circuit found that a failure to warn claim against Stratford
by subsequent victims of the teacher’s misconduct was improbable at the time
of the application82 and that such a claim likely would be “wholly frivolous.”83
Applying contra proferentem, the court concluded that the “probability”
standard in the application governed the exclusion, rather than the “could . . .
result” standard in the policy itself.84
In light of the timing of the insurance application, it is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that the misrepresentation was both material to the insured risk and
intended to deceive the insurer: the entire policy was obtained to ensure
coverage for the very risk Stratford denied anticipating.85 Nevertheless, the
court rejected the plain language of the policy exclusion in part to further a
policy interest in favor of coverage, concluding that “[i]t is because there are
possibilities that people take out insurance.”86 This tortured result under
traditional liability insurance doctrine is the one that would occur under the
Restatement’s scheme, in which the threat of rescission would remain and
contra proferentem would provide one of the only alternatives.87 In contrast,
under the Principles’ quasi-reformation approach, the court could have avoided
this strained application of contra proferentem without granting rescission to
the insurer by allowing the school district to maintain coverage while paying a
reasonable additional premium.88
Similarly, when the material nature of the misrepresentation is undeniable,
courts have found tenuous grounds to uphold claims that insurers waived their
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id. at 46.
Id.
Id.
Although the claim, of course, did occur, giving rise to the coverage dispute. Id.
Id. at 47.
Id.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 47.
See PRINCIPLES, supra note 22, § 1 cmt. b.
Id. § 11 cmt. a.
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right to the misrepresentation defense.89 In Haley v. Continental Casualty Co.,
the District Court for the District of Vermont and the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld coverage in the face of a material misrepresentation under such
a theory.90 The plaintiffs were officers of the policyholder Southwest Vermont
Supervisory Union (SVSU), which consisted of seven school districts.91 One of
the member school districts sued SVSU for incurring a deficit under both a
negligence theory and a Vermont statute, which prohibited such deficits.92 Two
years prior to the suit, SVSU had applied to renew its board of education
liability insurance policy, a duty to reimburse policy.93 The insurance
application was made during the four-year period in which the deficits were
incurred.94 In its application, SVSU stated that it had no “current expected
deficit” or “total accumulated deficit,” and that the Board had no “knowledge
of any potential claim against the school district.”95 At the time of the
application, however, SVSU “had a deficit of more than $1.2 million.”96 When
SVSU reported the application error to the insurer, it stated that “a bookkeeper
had made a mistake.”97 After alleging that the claim fell under several other
policy exclusions, the insurer moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that the policy be rescinded as void ab initio because SVSU’s answers to the
application questionnaire constituted material misrepresentations.98
The district court did not reach the question of whether the mistake was
innocent or fraudulent. Instead, the court found that the insurer’s statement that
it shortly would advise the insureds as to coverage “encourage[d] the insureds
to defend themselves diligently, confident in the knowledge that they [we]re
insured.”99 In addition to construing the insurer’s ambiguous statement as an
89 Waiver occurs when the insurer is aware of its right and has an “actual intention to relinquish it or
conduct so inconsistent with the intent to enforce the right as to induce a reasonable belief that it has been
relinquished.” Holt v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 680 So. 2d 117, 128–29 (La. Ct. App. 1996). Waiver may also
arise out of a failure to investigate; when “the insurer becomes aware of facts which would cause a reasonable
person to inquire further, the insurer is then subject to a duty of investigation. Failure to do so, constitutes a
waiver of all powers or privileges which a reasonable search would have uncovered.” Id.
90 749 F. Supp. 560, 561–62 (D. Vt. 1990).
91 Id. at 562.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 562–63.
97 Id. at 563.
98 Id. at 563–65.
99 Id. at 568.
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assurance to the insured, the court found that the insurer waived the claim
because the claim representative knew “not only was there a deficit, but that
some of the members of the school board were alleged to have concealed it”
before sending letters to SVSU suggesting that coverage might still have been
available.100 The court grounded its holding in public policy, noting that
Vermont’s “unwavering public policy against operating school districts at a
deficit” was outweighed by “countervailing policy considerations in favor of
attracting citizens to serve on community school boards that might warrant
coverage in this case.”101
The district court’s rule construes any communication made after the
insurer has discovered any facts giving rise to a suspicion of wrongdoing as an
immediate waiver of the rescission remedy.102 Application of such a rule
would require that an insurer not issue any communications to insureds,
however vague and innocuous, until the insurer had fully investigated the facts,
decided whether to pursue the defense, developed its theory, and finalized
coherent company-wide communication strategy regarding the issue. Such a
requirement would be commercially impracticable, especially in light of the
fact that in many cases, communications with the insured might be necessary
to obtain the information needed to complete these steps. This paralyzing
outcome, when applied indiscriminately as a strained alternative to rescission,
would prevent insurers from effectively dealing with material factual
uncertainties and would not accomplish the goals of ensuring fairness for
insurers and insureds.
As in Stratford,103 a reformation remedy would have allowed the insurer to
recover some of the loss it incurred as a result of the material misrepresentation
while allowing the court to accommodate the pressing policy concerns it
recognized. Because the misrepresentation was material (the insurer stated that
“it would not have issued the renewed policy or would have issued it on
different terms if it had known of the deficit situation”104), under the
Principles’ reformation provisions, an insurer would be entitled either to
collect or “deduct from the claim payment the additional premium that would

100
101
102
103
104

Id.
Id. at 571.
Id. at 568.
See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
Id. at 565.
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have been charged”105 or to collect “a reasonable additional premium for the
increased risk.”106 Either outcome would have provided the opportunity for
market-based streamlining of the school’s risk-taking in light of the insurer’s
substantive expertise.107
Application of a reformation remedy to school districts would allow courts
to preserve coverage for the insured in response to policy concerns without
denying the insurer recovery for the actual losses it has suffered. Such a
remedy would help clarify and streamline the law of misrepresentation as it has
been applied to educators professional liability insurance and would protect the
rights of insurers injured by school districts’ misrepresentations.
II. SCHOOL DISTRICTS AS DISTINCT FROM OTHER COMMERCIAL
POLICYHOLDERS
This Part will argue that public school systems should not be treated in the
same manner as other commercial policyholders under the Principles’
misrepresentation framework. First, this Part will address fundamental reasons
why school districts should not be treated under the Restatement’s uniform
approach to all policyholders in light of the Restatement’s grounding in
liability concerns typical of commercial policyholders, specifically public
companies. It will then analyze the importance and singularity of the policy
concerns inherent in school system liability insurance, with a focus on how
those concerns differ from the policy issues that attend the commercial
policyholders at issue in D&O and other liability insurance cases.
Treatment of school districts as equivalent to large public companies under
the Restatements’ misrepresentation framework would not provide a
satisfactory outcome for educators professional liability policy disputes in light
of courts’ deference to the public policy concerns inherent in educators

105

PRINCIPLES, supra note 22, § 11.
Id. §§ 1 cmt. e, 11. Section 11 also provided for prospective cancellation of the policy upon innocent
misrepresentation “within a reasonable time of the discovery.” Id. § 11.
107 For an example of liability insurer expertise in the educators professional liability context, see Juhi
Kaveeshvar, Comment, Kicking the Rock and the Hard Place to the Curb: An Alternative and Integrated
Approach to Suicidal Students in Higher Education, 57 EMORY L.J. 651, 657 (2008) (relying on the opinion of
an “analyst for the insurance company United Educators” on the risks faced by universities pursuing various
courses of action in response to suicidal students).
106
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professional liability policies.108 The gap between the sophisticated party
rationale espoused in the Principles and embodied in the Restatement and the
application of the Restatement’s approach to educational policyholders stems
from key differences in incentives and moral hazard between typical
commercial policyholders and school districts. A reformation remedy, in
contrast to the rescission attendant upon all policyholders under the
Restatement, would allow courts to address these specific policy
considerations while preserving fairness to the insurer and maintaining the
regulatory effects of insurance pricing and coverage.
A. The Nature of School District Insurance Policies
Subjecting school districts to the rescission remedy set forth in the
Restatement would deny coverage for a wide range of potential claims falling
under several available policies.109 A school district’s errors and omissions
policy, also known as educators professional liability insurance, covers claims
“arising out of the mistakes inherent in the practice of that particular profession
or business.”110 While coverage varies between policies, a typical policy also
extends to wrongful acts arising from “any actual or alleged breach of duty,
neglect, error . . . or omission committed solely in performance of duties for
the School District.”111 As discussed below, a professional liability policy may
extend to such claims as employment discrimination, negligent hiring and
supervision, sexual harassment, or civil rights claims by students.112

108 See supra note 101 and accompanying text for discussion of the Haley court’s deference to the public
policy concerns at issue.
109 See supra note 45 (discussing the range of circumstances in which rescission may be available under
traditional insurance doctrine).
110 Watkins Glen Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 732 N.Y.S.2d 70, 72 (App. Div. 2001)
(quoting Albert J. Schiff Assoc. v. Flack, 417 N.E.2d 84 (N.Y. 1980)) (noting that “[e]rrors and omissions
policies are common in the field of education” (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Mo. United Sch. Ins.
Council, 98 F.3d 343 (8th Cir. 1996); Bd. of Pub. Educ. of Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins.
Co., 709 A.2d 910 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); and Edinburg Consol. I.S.D. v. INA, 806 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Ct. App.
1991))).
111 Bd. of Pub. Educ. of the Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh, 709 A.2d at 913 (alteration in original); see also
Peerless Ins. Co. v. Pa. Cyber Charter Sch., 19 F. Supp. 3d 635, 654 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (noting that the School
Leaders Errors and Omissions Liability Insurance Policy at issue covered wrongful acts committed “in the
course of performing ‘educational institution’ duties”).
112 See, e.g., Watkins Glen Cent. Sch. Dist., 286 A.D.2d at 51 (holding that while sexual misconduct
committed by a teacher was an intentional act that would “generally” not be covered by an errors and
omissions policy, the risk incurred by “negligent hiring and supervision” of the teacher fell “squarely within”
the school district’s professional liability coverage).
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A majority of jurisdictions have denied a cause of action for general
educational malpractice.113 Liability does not extend to “negligence in the
educational process” resulting in such events as students’ failure to learn.114
For example, in Key v. Coryell, the Arkansas Court of Appeals explained that
policy considerations weighing against recognition of educational malpractice
include “the absence of a workable rule of care against which the defendant’s
conduct may be measured, the inherent uncertainty in determining the cause
and nature of any damages, and the extreme burden that would be imposed on
the resources of the school system and the judiciary.”115 However, causes of
action for negligent failures to provide specific educational opportunities to
which a student is entitled may fall under a professional liability policy.116
In contrast to its professional liability policy, a school district’s commercial
general liability policy covers third-party property damage and personal injury
claims.117 Claims against school districts for intentional employment
discrimination may be covered under either commercial general liability
policies or professional liability policies.118 Similarly, claims against school
districts for teachers’ sexual misconduct and abuse have been covered under

113 See, e.g., Key v. Coryell, 185 S.W.3d 98, 106 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting the cause of action,
noting the majority approach and citing rejection in Michigan, Alabama, Alaska, Louisiana, Connecticut, and
Florida). For recent analysis of substantive educational malpractice law in contexts of contemporary concern,
see Stijepko Tokic, Rethinking Educational Malpractice: Are Educators Rock Stars?, 2014 BYU EDUC. & L.J.
105.
114 Key, 185 S.W.3d at 106–07 (rejecting mother’s claim for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty,
negligence, and gross negligence when her son was dismissed from private school as a result of his behavior).
115 Id. at 106–07.
116 See, e.g., Sain v. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 626 N.W.2d 115 (Iowa 2001) (allowing a cause of
action when a high school counselor falsely advised a student that a particular English course would be
approved as one of the core classes required by the NCAA for freshman basketball participation). While
upholding the state’s previous refusal to recognize a cause of action for educational malpractice, the court
found that the “specific act of providing specific information requested by a student under circumstances in
which the school knew or should have known the student was relying upon the information to qualify for
future educational athletic opportunities” did not implicate the policy concerns behind the rejection of the tort
and was thus “more compatible with other claims for misrepresentation against professionals by clients who
have sought out their expertise.” Id. at 122.
117 See, e.g., Ill. Sch. Dist. Agency v. Pac. Ins. Co., 571 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2009) (general liability
insurance policy covered claims when student brought mercury home from school).
118 Compare Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 697 v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 515 N.W.2d 576 (Minn. 1994)
(holding that the terms of an errors and omissions policy that did not expressly exclude intentional acts
covered a claim of intentional age discrimination), with Sch. Dist. for Royal Oak v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 912 F.2d
844 (6th Cir. 1990) (applying Michigan law, holding that public policy did not prevent coverage for intentional
religious discrimination under a commercial general liability insurance policy).
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commercial general liability policies,119 although claims against the school
district for the negligent hiring and supervision of such teachers also are
commonly covered under educators professional liability policies.120
B. The Sophisticated Party Rationale as Applied to School Districts
Large commercial policyholders, as defined in §§ 1(4) and 1(7) of the
Principles, were permitted to contract out of mandatory quasi-reformation for
innocent misrepresentations.121 The Reporters explained that such large
companies should be able to afford sophisticated counsel to “explain the terms
of the policies” and negotiate with insurers.122 Small commercial
policyholders, in contrast, would have required the same level of protection as
individual consumers because “the operators of small businesses or other
organizations are not likely to be substantially more sophisticated, or to have
any greater ability to bargain over terms, than the average homeowner or auto
owner.”123 In eliminating the large and small commercial policyholder
distinction in the Restatement, the Reporters highlight the inappropriateness of
promulgating a “bright-line” rule in a Restatement but do not address the
ramifications of expanding the underlying sophisticated-party rationale to all
policyholders under the new, unified misrepresentation scheme.124 Under the
Restatement, all policyholders are treated in the same manner as the most
sophisticated policyholders under the Principles. Even if the majority of
policyholders are sophisticated commercial entities, this expansion of the
Principles’ approach is unjustified because the Principles’ treatment of large
commercial policyholders was primarily grounded in concerns specific to
public companies.
The inappropriateness of the Restatement’s unified approach does not stem
from any lack of sophistication on the part of school districts. Most school

119 See Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day Sch., Inc., 558 N.E.2d 958 (Mass. 1990) (analyzing claims
for sexual abuse on the part of educators and negligence and vicarious liability against the school district under
a commercial general liability policy); Wayne Twp. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs v. Ind. Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 1205
(Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the school district’s Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Coverage
covered sexual molestation by the principal, but the Educational Errors and Omissions policy did not, because
the student’s emotional distress constituted “bodily injury” under the policy’s terms).
120 See supra note 112.
121 PRINCIPLES, supra note 22, § 7 cmt. j.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 RESTATEMENT OF LIAB. INS. xvii, § 7 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2015).
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districts are more similar in sophistication to companies with counsel than to
“the average homeowner or auto owner.”125 In fact, school districts are
represented by general counsels and, frequently, substantial legal departments,
and these districts retain outside counsel for litigation and high-stakes
matters.126 While the steep costs of school district legal fees frequently incite
calls for reform,127 defenders of the expenses point to the importance of
sophisticated legal representation in the face of the complex issues faced by
school districts.128
Although, at first glance, school districts appear to be analogous to most
other commercial policyholders under the sophisticated-party rationale, this
fact alone does not justify their treatment under the uniform Restatement
approach because the sophisticated-party rationale never fully explained the
Principles’ treatment of large commercial policyholders in the
misrepresentation context. The Principles’ treatment of commercial
policyholders, as adopted and expanded by the Restatement, grew out of
substantive regulatory concerns uniquely pertinent to large public companies
rather than uniformly applicable to any sophisticated party.129
The sophisticated-party rationale is eclipsed by regulatory concerns unique
to public companies, as demonstrated by the Principles’ original choice of the
SEC standard specifically, as opposed to another financial threshold reflecting
the sophistication of the company, for its large commercial policyholder

125

Id. § 1 cmt. b.
See Jeffrey Robb, Bill Aimed at Schools’ Legal Fees Advances: The Judiciary Committee Adds a
Requirement that Districts Seek Bids from Attorneys, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Feb. 22, 2007, at B1
(discussing the approach of metro-area school districts in Omaha to selecting and retaining outside counsel).
127 See, e.g., Mensah M. Dean, Why Such High Pay for School-District Lawyers?, PHILLY.COM
(May 19, 2008), http://articles.philly.com/2008-05-19/news/24990404_1_school-employees-school-attorneyshigh-salaries (reporting that the Philadelphia School District’s Office of General Counsel included nineteen
attorneys with a budget of $13.5 million in fiscal year 2009, including almost $3 million in outside counsel
fees); Morgan Smith, In School Finance Battle, Legal Fees Accumulate, TEX. TRIB. (Sept. 8, 2014),
http://www.texastribune.org/2014/09/08/school-finance-battle-legal-fees-accumulate/ (noting that plaintiff
school districts had accumulated “more than $8.5 million” in attorney’s fees for “the four teams of lawyers
representing them” in their suit against the state “challenging the constitutionality of the state’s school finance
system”).
128 Dean, supra note 127 (quoting Philadelphia School District General Counsel Sherry Swirsky’s
argument that “[s]chool districts are the most highly regulated institutions that exist” and require highly
experienced lawyers who can grapple with “very technical compliance issues”).
129 The nexus between the treatment of commercial policyholders and regulatory concerns is evidenced by
the fact that the Principles’ large commercial policyholder definition “adopt[ed] the same asset-value
bright-line rule” as SEC regulatory disclosure requirements. PRINCIPLES, supra note 22, § 1 cmt. b.
126
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definition.130 While the Restatement has eliminated its bright-line standard, the
connection between the misconduct-curbing disclosures required of SEC
registrants and the threat of corporate wrongdoing under insurance policies
remains. The choice of SEC registration grew out of the Reporters’ deep roots
in the field of shareholder liability, where many of the activities regulated
through the insurance contract may be simultaneously addressed through SEC
disclosures.131 Baker and Swedloff point out that research has returned
“decidedly mixed conclusions” about the success of insurers in “manag[ing]
the moral hazard of public company D&O insurance.”132 SEC disclosure
requirements under federal law ostensibly provide more nuanced, standardized,
and policy-driven regulation.133 By expanding a framework originally designed
for large public companies to all policyholders, the Restatement creates a
system under which entities that do not share the same moral hazards and
regulatory conditions as public companies will suffer remedies that do not
address the underlying reasons for their misconduct.
C. Incentives for Misconduct in Public Companies and School Districts
The public accountability prong of the SEC disclosure threshold also
underscores a key difference between school systems and large public
companies: school districts’ lack of the profit incentive for misconduct
possessed by public companies.134 In the context of shareholder liability,
insurance policy provisions should protect the public from corporate
misconduct incentivized by insulation from the cost of the corporation’s
actions.135 Baker and Griffith’s work has revealed a number of deficiencies in
130 See id. In explaining this choice of standard, the Reporters note that the SEC has set its threshold for
registration because in the case of large companies, “the benefits to society of registration outweigh the burden
to the company.” Id.
131 See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 15, at 1426–27 (explaining that securities regulation and D&O
insurance operate on parallel tracks because D&O insurers “do not typically engage with public regulation of
corporate governance or with financial disclosure, for example through government relations efforts targeted at
the Securities Exchange Commission or at Delaware law reform”).
132 Id. at 1424.
133 See id. at 1426 (noting that “D&O insurance companies do not engage in significant loss prevention
research and education efforts”).
134 See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 14, at 90–91 (noting that risk-taking incentives in public
companies result from “pressures to manipulate results . . . throughout the firm” and may take the form of
excessive executive compensation, fraudulent revenue recognition procedures, and “channel stuffing,” a
strategy of “forc[ing] more inventory through a distributor than the distributor can handle”).
135 See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 15, at 1424 (explaining that “risk-based pricing mitigates the moral
hazard of D&O insurance by providing a modest incentive for avoiding claims” but that these effects are
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the ability of current insurance doctrine to effectively regulate corporate
misconduct.136
In the context of shareholder liability, Baker and Swedloff found that D&O
insurance coverage effectively operates as an income-smoothing blank slate
rather than a permission slip for specific activities, allowing insureds a wide
berth of activity free from governance intrusion on the part of insurers.137 This
freedom from governmental intrusion allows companies to pursue risky or
potentially unethical courses of action to reap higher profits.138 Negligent
misrepresentations pose a salient moral hazard for large commercial
policyholders, especially in light of the income-smoothing effect of D&O
liability insurance, to which there are few stringent governance requirements
attached.139 This moral hazard, however, is unlikely to arise in the context of
educators professional liability insurance, where risky behavior is unlikely to
be profitable for the institution and performance is governed by substantive
state regulation.140
In contrast to public companies, failure to prevent misconduct among
educators—or excessive risk-taking at the supervisory level—stems from
incentives and circumstances quite apart from a desire to maximize profits.
Certain schools may be more prone to teacher and administrator incompetence
and misconduct because local demographic factors may make a school more

limited by the fact that “insurers do not provide discounts for companies that undertake specific loss
prevention activities”).
136 BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 14, at 202.
137 Baker & Swedloff, supra note 15, at 1425 (“[A]ll but the most extraordinary securities class actions
will be a ‘nonevent’ in the life of a publicly traded company.” (quoting BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 14, at
126–27)).
138 See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 14, at 86–87 (explaining that “virtually all shareholder litigation
stems from investment loss” and that the profit-producing risk-taking sought out by investment analysts
concerns insurers, who “do not look favorably on high-growth companies” and “do not favor highly volatile
earnings”).
139 Baker & Swedloff, supra note 15, at 1424.
140 School districts also are governed by an alternative regulatory scheme, one that defines the parameters
of their existence and operations. A wide variety of mechanisms exists for states to regulate educator
misconduct. See Karen J. Krogman, Protecting Our Children: Reforming Statutory Provisions to Address
Reporting, Investigating, and Disclosing Sexual Abuse in Public Schools, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1605,
1612–20; Aaron Lawson, Educational Federalism: A New Case for Reduced Federal Involvement in K–12
Education, 2013 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 281, 283–84; Richard C. Herrera, Note, Policing State Testing Under No
Child Left Behind: Encouraging Students with Disabilities to Blow the Whistle on Unscrupulous Educators,
80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1433, 1457–59 (2007).
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difficult to staff.141 Research has demonstrated that “schools with the largest
numbers of low-income and minority students are much more likely than other
schools to report that they have difficulty filling vacancies.”142 Moreover,
“[t]hese schools are also more likely to fill vacancies with unqualified teachers,
substitutes, or teachers from other fields, or to expand class sizes or cancel
course offerings when they cannot find teachers.”143 Conversely, incompetence
and misconduct may also arise from motives completely unrelated to
resources. For example, “some districts hire unqualified teachers for reasons
other than shortages, including out-and-out patronage . . . and beliefs that
more-qualified teachers are more likely to leave and less likely to take
orders.”144
In addition to staffing challenges, administrative and regulatory complexity
often leads to poor management. One research team has noted that “urban
school systems are vastly more complex than businesses, yet the knowledge
about how to manage them is amazingly sparse.”145 Problems result from
archaic or underfunded administrative systems: “[I]nadequate management
information systems and antiquated hiring procedures . . . discourage or lose
good applicants in a sea of paperwork.”146
Negligence on the part of school districts frequently does arise from
financial constraints, however. For example, a school district held liable for
failure to accommodate a student with disabilities may have been unwilling to
make “the heightened investment in resources and personnel attention required
for students with disabilities under the [Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA)].”147 However, the fact that these financial pressures arise from a

141 Linda Darling-Hammond & Laura Post, Inequality in Teaching and Schooling: Supporting
High-Quality Teaching and Leadership in Low-Income Schools, in A NOTION AT RISK: PRESERVING PUBLIC
EDUCATION AS AN ENGINE FOR SOCIAL MOBILITY 127, 136 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2000).
142 Id. at 136.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 146 (observing that one study “found that many districts emphasize teachers’ ability to ‘fit
in’ . . . rather than their professional expertise”).
145 Stacey Childress, Richard Elmore & Allen Grossman, How to Manage Urban School Districts, HARV.
BUS. REV., Nov. 2006, at 55, 56 (noting that “[t]here is no management model” for school districts and that
while “[m]any corporate executives have exhorted superintendents and school boards to run their districts
more like businesses—apply the same management, leadership, and organizational approaches . . . . [t]he
differences between the two are greater than their similarities”).
146 Darling-Hammond & Post, supra note 141, at 147.
147 Ralph D. Mawdsley, Standard of Care for Students with Disabilities: The Intersection of Liability
Under the IDEA and Tort Theories, 2010 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 359, 360.
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genuine lack of resources rather than a desire to maximize profits demonstrates
that the difference between a reformed policy price and a full denial of
coverage may have a reduced effect on school district decision makers as
compared to corporate officers and directors.148
While commercial companies have strong incentives to remain focused on
the best interests of customers and shareholders built into their business model,
school districts may slip into negligence because “the voice of the customer
(the student) often gets lost in the din” of “parents and elected officials[] who
are often at odds over what success looks like and how to achieve it.”149 The
ease with which students’ needs slip through the cracks gives rise to liability
when school districts prioritize other concerns over students’ best interests.
However, unlike the case of corporate insureds, the vulnerability of student
plaintiffs and the importance of preventing uncompensated injuries make
insurance coverage essential for school districts.
D. Policy Concerns Necessitating Coverage of Claims Against School
Districts
States have recognized that certain fields of liability insurance, such as
no-fault auto insurance, entail special policy concerns that may make
rescission undesirable as a remedy.150 Under New York law, “rescission of
auto liability insurance policies after an accident stands in high disfavor, and is
generally prohibited”151 because “[a]utomobile accident reparation is
something special, born of a distinct and enlarging social need. It depends

148

See supra note 134 (discussing the incentive effect of risk-based pricing on public company behavior).
Childress et al., supra note 145, at 56.
150 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 222 A.2d 282, 289–90 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1966) (holding that state-mandated auto insurance could not be rescinded in the face of fraudulent
misrepresentations because “the benefit bestowed on innocent third parties emanates from the statute”).
151 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sullam, 349 N.Y.S.2d 550, 552 (Sup. Ct. 1973). The court goes on to explain that
auto insurance policies thus carry in a lower standard for waiver of the misrepresentation defense:
149

Certainly, where the rights of innocent auto accident victims are concerned, insurers who
undertake to investigate their insureds upon issuance of auto liability policies are charged with
the knowledge to which they are reasonably alerted. They cannot simply disregard danger
signs. . . . In auto accident cases, insurers who, in face of investigative results which signal
caution, accept premiums and let their policies continue to run, enabling their insureds to remain
on the roads, must reckon with the doctrine of estoppel when they seek post-loss disclaimer of
coverage.
Id.
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upon a specific public interest in policing roads and streets, and in making
provision for injuries sustained in automobile accidents.”152
Similarly, educators professional liability insurance—like all policies held
by school districts—responds to a critical and growing social need that arises
out of the central role of public education in our society.153 School districts’
statutory duties often extend far beyond mere provision of educational
services. For example, school systems may be required “[t]o protect the morals
and health of the pupils”154 or “to equip a child for his role as a citizen.”155 The
fundamental importance of public schools to the public interest, and the extent
to which the fundamental goals of education are jeopardized by negligence that
puts student safety at risk, necessitate special rules for the treatment of school
district liability insurance policies.
Rescission of school district insurance policies undermines the unique
concerns of public education. School districts require a greater guarantee of
coverage because of the sensitive nature of the claims at issue.156 It is well
established that for third-party insurance policies, such as commercial general
liability coverage for school districts, “public policy favors compensating
innocent victims.”157 Where victims would be unable to recover without a
liability insurance policy, public interest in favor of their compensation weighs
against the moral hazard of insulating the insured from the cost of its
wrongdoing.158
152

Id. at 558.
See Areto A. Imoukhuede, Education Rights and the New Due Process, 47 IND. L. REV. 467, 467
(2014) (arguing that public education “is essential to any meaningful concept of personal liberty and to
democracy”).
154 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-512 (West Supp. 2015).
155 Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (N.J. 1973).
156 Plaintiffs include disabled students denied access to equal educational opportunities, victims of
discrimination and other constitutional violations, and children sexually abused while under a school’s
supervision. See, e.g., Sch. Union No. 37 v. United Nat’l Ins. Co., 617 F.3d 554 (1st Cir. 2010) (reversing
dismissal of a claim for coverage arising from student’s IDEA claim); New Madrid Cnty. Reorganized Sch.
Dist. No. 1, Enlarged v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 904 F.2d 1236, 1238 (8th Cir. 1990) (coverage for successful § 1983
suit by teachers “denied renewal of teaching contracts, made involuntary reassignments, and denied certain
contractual benefits in retaliation for the teachers’ exercise of their First Amendment rights in joining a
particular educational association”); Doe v. Durtschi, 716 P.2d 1238, 1245 (Idaho 1986) (stating that the
school district “ignore[d] their statutory duty and retain[ed] known child molesters in the classroom with total
impunity”); Doe v. Tex. Ass’n of Sch. Bds., 283 S.W.3d 451 (Tex. App. 2009) (denying coverage under the
terms of the policy for a claim by a nine-year-old student sexually assaulted by a bus driver).
157 Christopher C. French, Debunking the Myth that Insurance Coverage Is Not Available or Allowed for
Intentional Torts or Damages, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 65, 94 (2012).
158 Id. at 94–95.
153
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The public interest in ensuring coverage for innocent victims is particularly
salient in the context of educators professional liability insurance, where
injured third parties are particularly vulnerable.159 Concern over whether third
parties would be compensated at all in the absence of liability insurance is
increasingly urgent in light of decreasing education funding and increasing
threats of municipal and school district insolvency.160 Moreover, school
districts may not only be unable to fully pay claims, but may also be entirely
immune from them as a result of governmental immunity in the absence of
insurance coverage.161
Insurance coverage of school districts is unique in its intimate relationship
to governmental immunity. The possibility of immunity amplifies the danger
that rescission will leave particularly vulnerable victims without compensation.
In many jurisdictions, the existence of insurance coverage is legally operative
in itself to waive governmental immunity on the part of the school district.162
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, for example, has recognized that “consent to
be sued or waiver of governmental immunity may be implied” by the school
district’s decision to obtain coverage, and the waiver extends “to the extent of
the insurance coverage.”163 Thus, the applicable policy may determine not only
whether governmental immunity applies at all but exactly those claims from
which the school district is immune.164
Thus, the scope of insurance coverage is of particularly paramount
importance to plaintiffs’ ability to recover for their injuries in the educational
context. For example, the Supreme Court of Montana found that a school
district had waived governmental immunity for the claims of a student injured
after being instructed to perform an unsupervised, unspotted “straddle-cut
dismount” from gymnastic rings during her gym class.165 The court concluded
that the policy coverage evidenced the school district’s intent to compensate
159

See supra note 156.
See Kristi L. Bowman, Before School Districts Go Broke: A Proposal for Federal Reform, 79 U. CIN.
L. REV. 895 (2011) (describing imminent school district insolvency). Insolvency has ramifications beyond
failure to compensate plaintiffs: “[F]iscal stability is one necessary component among many in determining
whether educational adequacy exists.” Id. at 902.
161 Markesinis & Stewart, supra note 19, at 436–37.
162 See, e.g., Crowell v. Sch. Dist. No. 7, 805 P.2d 522, 534 (Mont. 1991) (holding that “the purchase by
the School District of liability insurance waives its immunity to the extent of the coverage granted by the
pertinent insurance policy” and noting that at least sixteen other states had a similar waiver rule).
163 Lamont Ind. Sch. Dist. No. I-95 v. Swanson, 548 P.2d 215, 216–17 (Okla. 1976).
164 Id.
165 Crowell, 805 P.2d at 523.
160
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plaintiffs for such claims because “[t]he policy demonstrate[d] an intention on
the part of the School District to provide insurance extending coverage for the
type of personal injuries involved in the present case, and to provide by such
insurance for the settlement and payment of claims found to be properly
due.”166 The court relied on the school district’s sophistication and bargaining
position in finding that the waiver should be closely tailored to each claim of
the insurance coverage, noting that “the District readily could have excluded
coverage under the policy.”167
III. REFORMATION OF EDUCATORS PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
INSURANCE POLICIES
States should adopt a reformation remedy that would apply to all
misrepresentations by school districts. This remedy, like the quasi-reformation
remedy outlined in the Principles for innocent misrepresentations by small
commercial policyholders, would require the insurer to cover the claim while
allowing it to charge a reasonable increased premium for the coverage.168
Unlike the Principles’ quasi-reformation remedy, and in sharp contrast to the
strict liability rescission scheme envisioned by the Restatement, it would
ensure coverage for claims against school districts by applying even in the case
of intentional misrepresentations169 and by not permitting prospective
cancellation.170 This remedy would provide more flexibility to courts than the
binary remedies available to litigants under the current system, in which a
court may either rescind the policy entirely or order payment of the claim with
no change to the existing terms of the policy.171
In providing for mandatory reformation even after intentional
misrepresentations, this remedy would extend further than the framework
originally designed for small commercial policy holders under the
Principles.172 This reformation remedy would also extend further than the
Principles’ quasi-reformation remedy in that it would not provide for
prospective cancellation of the policy within a reasonable period of time.173
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

Id. at 533–34.
Id.
PRINCIPLES, supra note 22, § 11 cmt. a.
Id. § 7 (allowing rescission for intentional misrepresentations).
Id. § 11 (allowing cancellation “within a reasonable time of discovery”).
See supra notes 87–88.
PRINCIPLES, supra note 22, § 7 (allowing recission in the face of misrepresentation).
Id. § 11.
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The Principles envisioned a scheme under which courts would never order
policy reformation as a remedy for a material, fraudulent misrepresentation.174
The weight of state law supports this approach.175 Such material, fraudulent
misrepresentations do occur in the educators professional liability insurance
context, however. For example, the school district’s assertion in Stratford that
it was aware of no potential claims against it, despite the fact that it had just
recommended for employment a known perpetrator of sexual assault, could
readily be found to be a knowing and material misrepresentation.176
The policy concerns demanding coverage for claims arising from school
districts’ innocent misrepresentations are equally present and urgent when a
district has made a fraudulent misrepresentation. The egregiousness of leaving
public school students uncompensated for sexual abuse that occurred at school
is unaffected by the school district’s fraud. Because misconduct at schools
does not arise from profit-seeking motives,177 the financial incentive inherent
in the threat of rescission would not necessarily be effective in influencing the
school’s future behavior.
Proponents of limiting liability for claims against school districts deny the
primacy of the public interest in covering claims arising from the districts’
misconduct.178 They contend that large recoveries often occur in civil rights
and employment claims, which are purportedly unrelated to students’ interests,
force taxpayers to bear their cost, and “distract the administration and staff
from their primary purpose of educating students.”179 However, this
argument’s insistence that school district liability is inappropriate in light of
the need to avoid “inconvenience and punishment of the citizenry through
monetary judgments and costly litigation”180 ignores both the regulating and
smoothing effect that insurance coverage provides, and the cost to the public of
the harms sustained by innocent students.181
174

Id. § 7.
See supra notes 35–38 (allowing rescission for intentional and innocent misrepresentations); supra
notes 49–53 (allowing rescission for intentional misrepresentations).
176 See supra notes 79–85.
177 See supra notes 140–49 and accompanying text.
178 See, e.g., Amy P. Maloney & Matt J. O’Laughlin, The People Can Do No Wrong: An Examination of
State and Eleventh Amendment Governmental Immunity for Missouri’s Public School Districts, 74 UMKC L.
REV. 883 (2006).
179 Id. at 885.
180 Id.
181 See, e.g., Thomas v. Broadlands Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 201, 109 N.E.2d 636, 640–41 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1952) (“The only justifiable reason for the immunity of quasi-municipal corporations from suit for tort is
175
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While public companies and school districts face different regulatory
environments,182 both school districts and public companies may benefit from
insurance market regulation in addition to state regulation.183 Such regulation
is optimally accomplished through reformation remedies because the problem
of post-claim underwriting184 is particularly salient in situations of rare,
high-stakes risks,185 a condition exacerbated by the availability of rescission.
Furthermore, rescission undercuts the system’s ability to spread risk by
increasing access to the insurance pool for as many insureds as possible.186
The need for effective pricing and cost spreading is much more critical for
school districts than for public companies. In the corporate context, effective
cost spreading promotes economic efficiency of the insurance market, while
accurate pricing tailored to the real risks incurred by certain companies ensures
some fairness for more careful insureds.187 While these effects are salutary for
corporate insureds, they are matters of urgent public concern for school
districts, which operate with wide disparities in resources, resulting from
forces beyond the district’s control.188
Moreover, the fact remains that many plaintiffs are students who have been
harmed by the very educational activities the proponents seek to protect, a
reality ignored by a relentless emphasis on reducing public school liability at
all costs. The danger that administrators and staff will be “distracted” from
their job duties189 loses its relevance when those teachers are using their
positions as platforms to intentionally abuse students. Even to the extent that
policy concerns grounded in expense may undercut an absolute, generalized
the sound and unobjectionable one that it is the public policy . . . to prevent the diversion of tax moneys, in this
case school funds, to the payment of damage claims. . . . If the public funds are protected by liability
insurance, the justification and reason for the rule of immunity are removed.”).
182 See supra notes 132–40.
183 Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 16, at 200–01 (arguing that insurers are able “to assess the
distribution of harm and determine the desirability of safety measures” and that “private insurance markets can
and sometimes do outperform the government in regulating conduct because of both superior information and
competition”).
184 See Thomas C. Cady & Georgia Lee Gates, Post Claim Underwriting, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 809 (2000).
185 Barnes, supra note 28, at 340; see Susan Koehler Sullivan & David A. Ring, Recurring Issues in
Rescission Cases, 42 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 51 (2006).
186 BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 14, at 202; Barnes, supra note 28, at 351.
187 Avraham, supra note 39, at 34–35 (describing the “efficient insurance contract paradigm” in which
insurance law protects “insureds and insurers from contracting inefficiently due to transaction costs primarily
in the form of each other’s strategic behavior and hidden characteristics”).
188 Darling-Hammond & Post, supra note 141, at 136.
189 Maloney & O’Laughlin, supra note 178, at 885.
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policy interest in compensating all plaintiffs, school districts have long been on
notice that their purchase of liability insurance policies is construed as an
intent to compensate plaintiffs for particular claims.190 Therefore, their
continued decision to do so is a specific public policy choice that the
availability of rescission and cancellation under the Restatement approach
would contravene.
In contrast, a reformation remedy applied to misrepresentations by school
districts would recognize school districts’ policy choice without unfairness to
insurers. Under a reformation remedy, insurers would maintain the benefit of
the contract bargain by charging an increased premium based on the factors it
would have assessed had it known the true characteristics of the insured.191
These increased premiums would both adequately compensate insurers for
their actual losses and allow insurers to continue to engage in strategic pricing
to ensure optimal efficiency and behavioral incentives.
CONCLUSION
Student victims of intentional torts and negligence perpetrated by public
school teachers and administrators are among the most vulnerable tort victims.
Nevertheless, under current insurance doctrine as reflected and embodied by
the Restatement, student victims may fail to recover on judgments in their
favor because their school district’s insurance policy has been rescinded.
Under the Restatement scheme, school districts are subject to policy rescission
for both innocent and intentional misrepresentations. Not only does this
outcome deprive innocent victims of compensation, it ignores the economic
and policy realities of school district insurance coverage.
School districts do not resemble other commercial policyholders, either in
the reasons for their misconduct or the policies undergirding the need for
liability insurance coverage. The extreme financial punishment delivered by
rescission is unlikely to incentivize care on the part of school districts because
school district negligence is not the result of a desire to maximize profits.
Courts have recognized these key differences by treating school district
insurance application misrepresentations with lenience; however, the binary
nature of the remedies traditionally available to courts rendered this lenience

190
191

See supra notes 162–64.
PRINCIPLES, supra note 22, § 11 cmt. a.
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inequitable to insurers, preventing them from recovering any of the loss caused
by the insured’s misrepresentation.
The application of a reformation remedy to misrepresentations by school
districts would allow courts to answer the policy concerns inherent in school
district liability by providing coverage for claims while allowing insurers to
charge increased premiums for the risks posed by a particular school district’s
behavior. The tailored, risk-based pricing that will result from policy
reformation and increased premiums will provide optimal efficiency in the
insurance market for school districts, a market characterized by wide
disparities in resources and risks.
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